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THE PUBLIC USE TEST: WOULD A BAN
ON THE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
REQUIRE JUST COMPENSATION?
I
INTRODUCTION
The most recent comprehensive estimate places the number of firearms in
the United States in the area of 120 million.' Assuming an admittedly low
value of $75.002 is placed on each weapon, the present firearm stock is worth
approximately nine billion dollars. If Congress or a state legislature banned
possession of firearms, Congress and the courts would have to determine
whether the ban came within the fifth amendment's command that private
property not be "taken for public use, without just compensation."-3 This
note attempts to answer that question. The high monetary stakes and the
public's interest in gun legislation make this issue both important and timely. 4
One commentator described the Supreme Court's approach to public
taking law as "a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results."'5
The Court itself recently said that it was "quite simply . . . unable to develop
any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government. ' 6 The preliminary task of this note is to rationalize these
"apparently incompatible results" into a unified taking theory. It is the
authors' belief that the several tests which commentators have found to be
useful in this area-the physical invasion test, the diminution in value test, the
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noxious use test, and the police power test7-can be unified in a coherent
analysis. This analysis, which in general may be called the public use test,
explains the major Supreme Court taking cases and is predictable and easy to
apply.
The public use test can be summarized briefly. It applies a three-part
analysis to any legislation challenged under the taking clause. All three parts
of the test must be met before just compensation is required. The first part
determines whether there has been an appropriation of property at all.
Before the fifth amendment right to just compensation is triggered, private
property must be appropriated. To answer this question, the Court has
looked to whether the legislation has effected a physical invasion or outright
appropriation of the property. When this has not been the case, the Court has
looked to whether there has been a significant diminution in value or an
interference with distinct, investment-backed expectations.
The second part of the test determines whether the government (be it
federal, state, or municipal) has the constitutional power to enact the
legislation. 8 In the case of a federal law, the test is whether the enactment is
within the federal government's enumerated powers or such implied powers
as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers. In
the case of a state or municipal law, the test is whether the enactment is within
the ambit of the police power. If the act is not within the government's
constitutional power, it is completely invalid.9
The third part of the test determines whether a valid appropriation of
property requires compensation. Proceeding from the words of the
amendment, which requires compensation only when private property is
taken for "public use," the test distinguishes between general public welfare
or evil-avoidance legislation and legislation in which the government intends
for the public, or the government itself, to use the property.
This public use test illustrates the limited scope of the taking clause. At
first glance, the public use limits on compensation seem unjust. Surely, when
a regulation involves a widespread benefit, as does a zoning ordinance, or a
7. See, e.g.. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just
Compensation" Law. 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (discussing "Physical Invasion," "Diminution in
Value," and "Private Fault and Public Benefit"); Sax, supra note 5 (discussing "Invasion Theory,"
"Noxious Use," and "Diminution in Value").
8. It is in this portion of the analysis that a ban on the possession of firearms would be tested
against the second amendment, an inquiry beyond the scope of this note.
9. If an action is found to be a "taking" and invalidated solely because of a failure to
compensate, the government may have the option of either providing permanent compensation or
rescinding its action. If the government-chooses the latter course, it probably must nevertheless
provide compensation for the "temporary taking" which has occurred. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658-59 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
If an action - either a police power regulation' or an eminent domain taking - is struck down
because it goes beyond a government's legitimate -powers, however, it cannot be cured by
compensation and must be invalidated. In that case, it would be logically inconsistent to say that a
"temporary taking" had occurred during the period the invalid act was in effect. Rather, the
property owner may have an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that his property
was taken without due process of law, thereby depriving him of his civil rights. See San Diego Gas &
Eler. Co.. 450 U.S. at 656 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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regulation of firearms, the benefitted public as a whole should pay for
whatever individual property rights are destroyed or diminished by the
regulation. If one were to frame a new constitution, this sense ofjustice might
be the starting point for a clause requiring compensation for diminished
property rights whenever the diminution was caused by public welfare
legislation. Our analysis is governed not by some hypothetical constitution,
however, but by the fifth amendment, which requires compensation only in a
limited number of situations. Moreover, almost any regulation tends to
diminish someone's property or his liberty to use it. The government literally
cannot afford to pay for every reduction in property values that it may cause.
To quote Justice Holmes, "Government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law." 10 For better or worse, the taking clause does
not require compensation in all cases in which property interests are adversely
affected. Rather, it draws the line where private property is taken "for public
use.
This note discusses the three subsections of the tripartite analysis: (1)
whether there is appropriation; (2) whether there is the power to
appropriate; and (3) whether the appropriation is for the public use. Both
the established tests and our public use test will then be applied to a federal
ban on the possession of firearms.
II
APPROPRIATION
The beginning point for any analysis of a compensable "taking" is to
examine whether property has been taken at all. Straightforward as the
question seems, it has caused much controversy and confusion. This note
divides the threshold inquiry into two tests. The first, the physical
appropriation test, concerns instances in which it is clear that before the
alleged taking the owner owned property but afterwards did not. The second,
the diminution in value test, argues that government regulation is a taking
when it so restricts the use of property that little of its value remains to the
owner. Recently, this inquiry has been conducted by reference to an owner's
"reasonable investment-backed expectations.'''I
It bears emphasis that the inquiry into whether property has been
appropriated remains only a threshold inquiry. Only when governmental
action satisfies all three aspects of the public use test will a compensable
taking result. Therefore, the cases discussed in this section may come down
10. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). In addition. sec Justice
Brandeis's famous dissent in the same case. Id. at 417 ("Every restriction upon the use of property
imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed.
and is, in that sense an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making
compensation.") (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1I. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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on either side of the compensation issue, depending on how they fare under
the remainder of the analysis.
A. Physical Appropriation
The physical appropriation test looks for an appropriation in its most
literal sense: that is, a transfer of possession or ownership of property away
from the owner. Such an appropriation of property obviously occurs where
the government takes ownership of the property in its entirety, taking a fee
simple interest in the whole. Also included, however, are those cases in which
government forces the owner to destroy or abandon the property and those in
which government appropriates only part of the owner's "bundle of rights."
Courts sometimes characterize the latter situation as "physical invasion" of
the property, because typically when only some of an owner's property rights
are divested, the property is "invaded" by the rights of others in the form of
an easement. 12
Instances of total appropriation of property by the government are by
their very nature easily determined, occasioning little controversy as to
whether divestiture has occurred. Traditional condemnation of realty for
construction of highways and other public works, confiscation of needed
supplies or fuel in time of war, and forfeiture of property held illegally as
contraband would all fall into this category. Similarly, forced destruction of
property is fairly clear-cut. Examples include the ordered destruction of oil
facilities to prevent their use by enemy forces, as was the case in United States v.
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 13 and the destruction of unwholesome milk to prevent
disease, as ordered in Adams v. Milwaukee. 14 Disposal of property, such as
handguns under the local ordinance in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, '5 or
liquor in the various prohibition cases, 16 would also come under this heading.
The "physical invasion" situation has been somewhat more difficult to
determine. In one of the most recent Supreme Court cases on the subject,
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 17 the Court found that, although the government
was not attempting to take a fee interest in the property in question, its
proposal to open a private area to public access constituted a taking of part of
the owner's valuable property right to exclude others.' 8 Kaiser Aetna, the
lessee of a large Hawaiian estate that included both land and a large pond,
developed the property into a residential and recreational subdivision called
Hawaii Kai. As part of the development, Kaiser Aetna dredged the pond,
constructed a marina, and created direct channels from the pond to a bay of
the Pacific Ocean. The government claimed that since the pond had become a
12. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
13. 344 U.S. 149 (1952)..
14. 228 U.S. 572 (1913).
15. 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. I1. 1981), af'd, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied. 464 U.S.
863 (1983).
16. See. e.g., Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925); Mugler v. Kansas. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
17. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
18. Id. at 180.
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navigable waterway, it was subject to the "navigational servitude" of the
federal government. As a result, Kaiser Aetna could not deny the general
public access to the marina. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Rehnquist
stated that:
This is not a case in which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a
manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private property;
rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an
actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina. . . . And even if the
Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay
just compensation. 19
Because the government had taken an easement in the property, it had
appropriated some of the owner's property rights, meeting the physical
invasion test.
The airport-overflight cases also fall under the invasion analysis. In United
States v. Causby,20 a chicken farmer whose property was directly under the
flight path of military planes at a government airport complained that his farm
was rendered useless because the noise, glare, and vibration so disturbed his
chickens that they were killed by flying into the walls from fright. In finding a
compensable taking, the Court relied on the theory that the flights constituted
a physical invasion of Causby's airspace and as such created an easement
across his property taken by the government. 2' The Court relied upon Causby
sixteen years later in Griggs v. Allegheny County22 to award compensation to a
homeowner whose house was directly under the flight path of planes using the
Allegheny County airport. Consistent with the physical invasion-easement
analysis, property owners who have been similarly damaged by noise and
vibration but whose properties were not directly under flight paths, and
therefore not literally physically invaded, have been universally unsuccessful
in obtaining condemnation awards. 23
B. Diminution in Value
Although sometimes put forth as an entirely separate test for determining
when there has been a compensable taking, the diminution in value test has
been used mainly as a means of determining whether or not there has been a
physical appropriation of property. The test is attributed to Justice Holmes's
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,24 oft-cited for the proposition that
"[o]ne fact for consideration . . . is the extent of the diminution. When it
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."25 Holmes
continued, "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
19. Id.
20. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
21. Id. at 265-67.
22. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
23. See Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Batten %. United States, 306 F.2d 580
(10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
24. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
25. Id. at 413.
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to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."2 Although this language actually had little bearing on the Court's
reasoning in Pennsylvania Coal,27 and although the "diminution in value" test
has never been determinative in a Supreme Court fifth amendment taking
case, 28 the test has persisted in dicta throughout the line of Supreme Court
eminent domain cases.
For example, in the 1962 case of Goldblatt v. Hempstead,29 the Court
discussed extensively the decrease in value of Goldblatt's property that would
result from a zoning ordinance before dismissing it as inapplicable to the
outcome of the case. Goldblatt involved a series of ordinances passed by the
town of Hempstead which successively restricted the operation of Goldblatt's
sand and gravel mine. The town brought suit to enjoin Goldblatt from
mining, on the grounds that he was violating an ordinance which both
prohibited mining below the water table and imposed an affirmative duty to
refill the mine. Goldblatt's defense was based on the premise that the
ordinance effectively prevented him from carrying on his business. The
prohibition, therefore, so reduced the value of his property as to constitute a
taking. The Court stated, however, that "the fact that it [the ordinance]
deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it
unconstitutional. '" 30 The clear implication of this statement should have been
that the diminution in value test would never be dispositive of whether a
taking had occurred. Nevertheless, Justice Clark's opinion continued (citing
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 31 and United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 3 2
neither of which was ultimately decided by the test 33 ):
This is not to say, however, that government action in the form of regulation cannot
be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires
compensation. . . . There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and
taking begins. Although a comparison of values before and after is relevant, it is by no
means conclusive, see Hadacheck v. Sebastian, where a diminution in value from
$800,000 to $60,000 was upheld. How far a regulation may go before it becomes a
taking we need not now decide, for there is no evidence in the present record which
even remotely suggests that prohibition of further mining will reduce the value of the
lot in question.
34
26. Id. at 415.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
28. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (regulation forbidding
construction of office tower under lease agreement generating at least $3 million annually);
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (regulation prohibiting continued excavation of sand
and gravel mine); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning law resulting
in 75% diminution in value of property); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (property
worth $800,000 for brickmaking reduced to $60,000 if restricted for residential use); see Sax, supra
note 5, at 44.
29. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
30. Id. at 592.
31. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
32. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
33. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon is discussed ifra, text accompanying notes 76-81. In
Central Eureka 1hMining Co., the mine owner was prevented from operating his mine, clearly a
substantial diminution in its value to him. Nevertheless, compensation was not awarded.
34. 369 U.S. at 594 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 49: No. I
Page 223: Winter 1986]
The Court apparently felt the need to pay lip service to the diminution in
value test without actually relying on it.
The diminution in value test was once again considered by the Court in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 35 although it was phrased in
terms of "distinct investment-backed expectations."-3 6 Justice Brennan's
opinion in Penn Central provides an apt example of the confusion that arises
when the Court continues to invoke a test yet does not rely on it. Early in the
opinion, the Court stated: "Appellants concede that the decisions sustaining
other land-use regulations, which, like the New York City law, are reasonably
related to the promotion of the general welfare, uniformly reject the
proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a
'taking.' "37 Although the Court thus initially rejected the diminution in value
test, it nevertheless returned to the analysis later in its opinion:
We now must consider whether the interference with appellants' property is of such a
magnitude that "there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain [it]" [citing Pennsylvania Coal]. That inquiry may be narrowed to the question
of the severity of the impact of the law on appellants' parcel.
3 8
The Court ultimately concluded that the damage to Penn Central was not
sufficiently great to warrant compensation because the law did not interfere
with the current use of the terminal and because the company had the ability
to transfer its air rights over the terminal for value.3 9
Penn Central suggests that reciting the diminution in value/investment-
backed expectations analysis remains de rigueur. Similarly, Kaiser Aetna
reiterated the test in its basic outline of taking analysis: "Rather, [this Court]
has examined the 'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries that have identified several factors-such as the economic impact of
the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action-that have
particular significance."-40
If it is assumed, then, that the diminution in value test is alive and well,
there are two alternative measures of appropriation: that is, either actual
appropriation of the property or some portion thereof, or regulatory
diminution of its value. In either form, a determination of government
appropriation is the threshold inquiry in finding a compensable taking.
However, contrary to Professor Michelman's assertion that "courts, while they
sometimes do hold nontrespassory inquiries compensable, never deny
compensation for a physical takeover, ' 4' even the physical appropriation test
is not dispositive on the issue. Rather, this note shows that all three
35. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
36. Id. at 124 ("The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations.").
37. Id. at 131.
38. Id. at 136.
39. Id. at 136-37.
40. 444 U.S. at 175.
41. Michelman, supra note 7, at 1184.
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requirements of the public use test must be met before compensable taking is
found.
III
VALIDITY OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
The next step in the analysis of a compensable taking is to determine
whether the act in question is a legitimate exercise of governmental power.
States may exercise control over the property of their citizens through their
sovereign powers of eminent domain, 42 their power to tax, and their police
powers.
Because the police power and the eminent domain power were
traditionally considered to be distinct and mutually exclusive, 43 distinguishing
which power a state government was exercising became important in
determining the legitimacy of a taking and the need for compensation. What
emerged was the "police power" test, which held that a given governmental
action was not a compensable taking simply because it was an exercise of
traditional state police power.44 While the distinction between the police and
eminent domain powers has become less important over time, the older case
law is still cited in modern decisions, sometimes with confusing effect.
Whether characterized as an exercise of eminent domain, police power, or
some other source of governmental authority, an appropriation of private
property may be undertaken only if the benefit inures to the public as a whole.
If the government attempts to appropriate property for an invalid public
purpose or for an exclusively private purpose,45 the attempt will be struck
down as going beyond the government's legitimate sphere of activity,
regardless of whether provision is made for compensation.
A. The Police Power
The classic definition of police power is that power of a state which is
"exerted for the protection of the health, morals, and safety of the people."' 46
These terms are used in their broadest possible compass: "Public safety,
public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some of the
42. See P. NICHOLS, THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 3, 7, 8 (1909);J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480-82 (2d ed. 1983).
43. See generall vJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 42, at 480; P. NICHOLS, Supra note
42, §§ 17, 18; see also Michelman, supra note 7, at 1167-68.
44. See, e.g., 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 645 (1956) ("The guaranty of due process of law
prohibits the confiscation of property or the destruction of property without compensation, except
where the property is taken or destroyed in a valid exercise of the general police power.") (emphasis added);
authorities cited supra note 43; see also Fesjian v. Jefferson, 399 A.2d 861, 866 (D.C. 1979): Lamm v.
Volpe, 449 F.2d 1202. 1203 (10th Cir. 1971) (dicta).
45. "It is fundamental in American jurisprudence that private property cannot be taken by the
Government, national or state, except for purposes which are of a public character, although such
taking be accompanied by compensation to the owner." Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard
Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1905); see also Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55,
80 (1936); Nichols, The Aleaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REV. 615, 615
(1940).
46. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887).
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more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police
power. . . . Yet, they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not
delimit it.'47
In more concrete terms, the police power forms the basis for public
welfare legislation, such as zoning laws and provisions for roads and schools;
evil-avoidance legislation, such as prohibitions on noxious activities,
unhealthy food, or dangerous products; and criminal laws prohibiting the use
of property for illegal ends or the possession of unlawful weapons, drugs, or
other items. It is clear that the police power suffices to justify government
regulation, destruction, or appropriation of property. As the Supreme Court
stated over fifty years ago in Miller v. Schoene,48 "[w]here the public interest is
involved preferment of that interest over the property interest of the
individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects property."-49
1. Police Power Test. Mugler v. Kansas50 is generally regarded as the
beginning of modern compensation law, 5' and it is, as well, the first case to
hold that an exercise of the police power is not a compensable taking. Mugler
had built an otherwise lawful brewery in 1877, but in 1881 the state of Kansas
passed a law stating that "[t]he manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors
shall be forever prohibited in this State, except for medical, scientific, and
mechanical purposes." 52 Mugler was indicted for both the sale of his beer
and for the maintenance of a " 'common nuisance, to wit:' his brewery." 53
The Court held that the prohibition on the use of his property as a
brewery was not a taking because:
The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public
nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes
depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use .... In the one
case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property is taken away from
an innocent owner. 5 4
Mugler thus became the precursor of a long line of cases holding that a
government action would not be a fifth amendment taking if it fell within the
realm of the police power.
2. Criminal Forfeiture. Criminal forfeiture of property is rarely analyzed as
an eminent domain question, because the government's power to enact and
enforce criminal laws comes within the police power. These laws can result in
government appropriations of property if that property is contraband-stolen
property, property used in commission of a crime, or property which it is
47. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); see Noble State Bank v. Haskell. 219 U.S. 104. II1
(1911) (police power includes right to create bank guaranty fund to insure depositors).
48. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
49. Id. at 279-80.
50. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
51. Sax, Takings, Private Propert v and Piblic Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 n.3 (1971).
52. 123 U.S. at 624.
53. Id. at 625.
54. Id. at 669.
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illegal to possess. Such appropriation of illegally possessed property was
challenged as an uncompensated taking in Fesjian v. Jefferson.55 The District of
Columbia handgun statute challenged in that case allowed only certain types
of guns to be registered and, where registration was denied, required the guns
to be surrendered, removed from the District, or otherwise eliminated. When
a gun was voluntarily surrendered, no compensation was paid. In holding
that the statute effected no compensable taking, the court stated that the fact
"[t]hat the statute in question is an exercise of legislative police power and
not eminent domain is beyond dispute." 56 This distinction answered the
taking question because, presumably, under the court's analysis, the two
powers were mutually exclusive.
Criminal forfeiture can even extend to the property owner who is
completely "innocent," in that he lawfully acquires property which
subsequently becomes contraband per se through force of a statute outlawing
possession and subjecting the property to forfeiture. Such was the case in
Miller v. McLaughlin.57 In that case, Nebraska had passed a statute prohibiting
fishing with nets and making the possession of fishing nets unlawful,
regardless of whether the nets were actually used. Miller's complaint was
based on due process, rather than just compensation grounds; nevertheless,
the Court's holding seems equally applicable to either point:
A State may regulate or prohibit fishing in its waters, and, for the proper enforcement
of such statutes, may prohibit the possession within its borders of the special
instruments of violation, regardless of the time of acquisition or the protestations of
lawful intentions on the part of a particular possessor.
5 8
Samuels v. McCurdy59 is factually analogous. A Georgia statute made
possession of alcoholic beverages illegal, thereby subjecting Samuels's liquor
to seizure despite the fact that it had been lawfully purchased and brought
into Georgia prior to the enactment of the statute. The reasoning behind the
Court's decision was arguably flawed;60 nevertheless, its holding-that the
liquor could be taken without compensation because "[l]egislation making
possession unlawful is . . . within the police power of the state as a reasonable
55. 399 A.2d 861 (D.C. 1979).
56. Id. at 866.
57. 281 U.S. 261 (1930).
58. Id. at 264 (citations omitted). See also the opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court in the
case below: "A valid exercise of police power may affect or destroy values, where the use of property
for its original purpose has become unlawful by a change in public policy as disclosed by a new
statute. Prohibition thus affected property in breweries, but the legislation on that subject was
nevertheless sustained. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623." Miller v. McLaughlin, 118 Neb. 174, 178,
224 N.W. 18, 21 (1929).
59. 267 U.S. 188 (1925).
60. Justice Taft's analysis was really an exercise in salami tactics: he reasoned that since under
, ugl property can be successively regulated until its worth is negligible, "[w~hy should
compensation be made now for the mere remnant of the original right if nothing was paid for the
loss of the right to sell [the liquor], give it away or transport it?" 267 U.S. at 198.
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mode of reducing the evils of drunkenness" 6 '-puts the case squarely in line
with the other forfeiture cases. 62
3. Noxious Use. Police power also includes the state's power to abate a
nuisance, that is, to forbid the "noxious use" of property. Therefore, some
cases have held that if a state confiscates or orders the destruction of a
noxious use, it is necessarily using its police power and need not
compensate. 63 For example, in Lawton v. Steel,64 the Supreme Court upheld a
New York statute that stated that any fishing net maintained in the water in
violation of the fishing laws "is hereby declared to be, and is, a public
nuisance, and may be abated and summarily destroyed by any person." 65
After asserting that the preservation of game and fish was within the proper
domain of the police power,66 the Court found the summary abatement,
without the fifth amendment protections of due process and just
compensation, to be legitimate. 67 In Adams v. Milwaukee,68 the destruction of
potentially unwholesome milk was found to be the abatement of a public
nuisance, and the owners of the milk were not compensated. Similarly, in
North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago,69 the Court held that unwholesome
food "should be summarily seized and destroyed to prevent the danger which
would come from eating it. ' '70
Many of the major fifth amendment cases have been categorized as
nuisance cases: iiller v. Schoene7 l involved the destruction of trees which were
infected with cedar rust; Mugler v. Kansas72 involved the closure of a brewery;
Hadacheck v. Sebastian73 involved the closure of a brickyard; and Goldblatt v.
Hempstead7 4 involved closure of a gravel pit. The Court in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York pointed out, however, that many of these cases
involved nothing noxious:
We observe that the uses in issue in Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt were perfectly
lawful in themselves .... These cases are better understood as resting not on any
supposed "noxious" quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the
restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of a policy-not unlike
historic preservation-expected to roduce a widespread public benefit and applicable
to all similarly situated property. 71
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (forfeiture of
yacht transporting marihauna upheld).
63. See Michelman, supra note 7, at 1196-1201; Sax, supra note 5, at 48-50.
64. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
65. Id. at 135.
66. Id. at 138.
67. Id. at 140.
68. 228 U.S. 572, 584 (1913).
69. 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
70. Id. at 315.
71. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
72. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
73. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
74. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
75. 438 U.S. at 133 n.30.
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In Hadacheck and Goldblatt, for example, otherwise lawful uses of property
were prohibited so that the land could be used for residential purposes. In
both cases, the land was distant from residential property when the "noxious
use" was begun. Clearly, the industrial uses of the property were originally
lawful. The state merely made a choice between the value of the mine or the
brickyard and the value of residential property and decided that residential
property was more beneficial to the public. Nevertheless, regardless of
whether the original use was prohibited because it was less beneficial to the
public, it was within the state's police power to regulate.
B. Eminent Domain and the Public Use Requirement
While the scope of a government's police power has thus been viewed
broadly to legitimize any act which accrues to the public benefit, a state's
power of eminent domain was at first construed more narrowly. It only
allowed property to be taken "for public use," which was defined more
narrowly than the broader "public benefit." 76 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon77
provides an excellent example of the public use/public benefit distinction. In
that case, Pennsylvania enacted a statute that prohibited mining of anthracite
coal if it would cause subsidence of the surface at any location on which there
were houses, factories, stores, public buildings, or streets. The state justified
the act on standard police power grounds: that coal operations under the
land carried out without preservation of the support of the surface constituted
a "grave menace to the life, health and safety of the public." 78 The coal
company, which had duly paid for not only the mineral rights but also the
support rights which would have protected the surface, stood to lose the right
76. See, e.g., J. GELIN & D. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 12-15 (1982); 1 P.
NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 128-36 (2d ed. 1917), and cases cited id. at 129 n.17;
Nichols, supra note 45, at 617-33.
The distinctions made between "public use" and "public benefit" in some early state cases
striking down a taking as beyond the eminent domain power should not be confused with the
distinction which the test set out in this note makes between public use and public benefit. The
earlier cases made the distinction as part of an inquiry into the legitimacy of the government's action
(the inquiry in the second part of this note's public use test); in part three of the test proposed here,
the distinction is made in determining which legitimate government acts require payment of
compensation and which do not. Furthermore, the parameters of a defined "public use" have
widened considerably over the years, wholly changing the distinction to be made between public use
and public benefit. The law has generally progressed to a position which regards a government use
of property for the public benefit-even a government sale of property to private parties for the
public benefit-as a sufficient public use to legitimize a government taking. After accepting that
government use can be equated with public use, so long as it is within the public benefit limitation,
this note suggests a new distinction between that "use" and a government regulation which results in
some "benefit" to the public without any literal use of the property by either the government or the
public at large. For example, under the old use/benefit distinction, a state taking of land for urban
renewal might be challenged because the public did not use the property in the same sense that it
could use a highway; under the new use/benefit distinction, the government must offer
compensation if it takes land for urban renewal, but is not required to compensate if it merely passes
a regulation, such as a zoning ordinance, historic preservation law, or height restriction, from which
the public passively benefits.
77. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
78. Id. at 405 (argument for Pennsylvania).
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to mine substantial coal reserves and brought suit to enjoin enforcement of
the statute on the ground that it was unconstitutional.
The Court struck down the statute on two distinctly different grounds.
First, as applied to private property, the appropriation was not for a public
purpose and could not be sustained under the government's police power.
Second, as applied to public property, the taking for public use was
constitutional but had to be accompanied by compensation. Justice Holmes
arrived at the former conclusion by analyzing the statute as it applied to
surface rights owned by a private individual who had his residence on the
property. Holmes noted that because the individual homeowner did not own
the support rights, a "source of damage to such a house is not a public
nuisance even if similar damage is inflicted on others in different places. The
damage is not common or public." 79 Therefore, the Court ruled that the
statute was not a legitimate exercise of governmental power: "[T]he statute
does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a
destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights [i.e., the coal
company's right of ownership in the mineral and support rights]."8 0 In
contrast, when the Court in dicta addressed the application of the statute to
surface rights that were owned by the public, it found the government
regulation to be legitimate, but required that it be done in the context of
eminent domain proceedings. 8'
Justice Holmes's analysis could have proceeded equally from a recognition
that the statute in effect required a transfer of support rights-a legally
recognized property interest-away from the owner, regardless of the value of
those rights or the extent to which the statute decreased their value.
Requiring such a transfer from one private party to another was beyond the
power of the government. Requiring the transfer from a private owner to the
government for the support of public roads and buildings was clearly a
compensable taking.
C. Rejection of the Police Power Test in Favor of A Public Use Test
While the police power test holds that the police and eminent domain
powers are mutually exclusive, an alternate branch of cases holds that the
police power includes fifth amendment takings. For example, in Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Commmissioners,1- the
Court rejected the police power test, holding that the real distinction is
between those regulations which take property for public use and those
regulations which merely take property for the public good:
Private property cannot be taken without compensation for public use under a
police regulation relating strictly to the public health, the public morals or the public
79. Id. at 413.
80. Id. at 414.
81. Id. at 415.
82. 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
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safety, any more than under a police regulation having no relation to such matters, but
only to the general welfare.
• * . The constitutional requirement of due process of law, which embraces
compensation for private property taken for public use, applies in every case of the
exertion of government power. If in the execution of any power, no matter what it is,
the Government, Federal or state, finds it necessary to take private property for public
use, it must obey the constitutional injunction to make or secure just compensation to
the owner.
8 3
More recently, the district court in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove84 stated
this view similarly:
It is well established that a Fifth Amendment taking can occur through the exercise of
the police power regulating property rights. In order for a regulatory taking to
require compensation, however, the exercise of the police power must result in the
destruction of the use and enjoyment of a legitimate private property right. 85
In 1954, the Supreme Court decided Berman v. Parker,8 6 which largely
eliminated the need for any distinction between a state's police power and its
eminent domain power. In that case, property owners challenged the District
of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 as effecting a taking of private
property that was not for public use. The act set up a comprehensive urban
renewal plan for Washington, D.C., under which the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Land Agency was to acquire and assemble real property for
redevelopment, sometimes by private parties. In deciding the case, the Court
first noted that although the law was an act of Congress, Congress was acting
in the capacity of a state government for the District of Columbia,8 7 and thus
could exercise the police power normally reserved to the states.88 The Court
found that in enacting the urban renewal plan, Congress was attempting to
improve the general public welfare of the District of Columbia; such public
welfare legislation was within the scope of the police power. The fact that the
act provided for condemnation and compensation did not limit its scope
under some narrower eminent domain power. Rather, the Court ruled,
"Once the object is within the authority of Congress [acting as a state
government], the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is
clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.'"
The effect of the Berman v. Parker holding was to expand the parameters of
the eminent domain power to the outer limits of a state's police power to pass
social legislation. Judicial review of this broad power would be extremely
limited, since "[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-
nigh conclusive." 90
83. Id. at 592-93.
84. 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. I11. 1981), aftd, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), rert. denied. 464 U.S.
863 (1983).
85. Id. at 1183-84.
86. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
87. Id. at 31.
88. Id. at 32.
89. Id. at 33.
90. Id. at 32.
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Such an interpretation was explicitly affirmed in 1984 in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff,1' in whichJustice O'Connor flatly stated, "The 'public use'
requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police
powers."'9 2 She went on to note that "where the exercise of the eminent
domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court
has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use
Clause.' 3
Midkiff illustrates how far the Court has been willing to go to find a public
use justifying a taking. The act under challenge in that case was the Hawaii
Land Reform Act of 1967, passed to alter the oligopolistic pattern of land
ownership in Hawaii. The first Polynesian settlers in Hawaii had established a
feudal system of land ownership in which certain subchiefs held large tracts of
land at the will of the islands' high chief. In the mid-1960's, the Hawaii
legislature found that the pattern of land ownership which had evolved from
the original feudal system remained one of concentration of land in the hands
of a few owners. Therefore, the legislature set up a procedure whereby
tenants wishing to purchase the property on which they lived could ask the
Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) to condemn the property, pay market price
to the owners, and sell it to them. The HHA was authorized to lend such
purchasers up to ninety percent of the purchase price.94 When the lands of
certain landowners were threatened by condemnation under the scheme, the
owners filed suit to enjoin the act's enforcement, arguing in part that the
taking was not one "for public use." Their argument, as articulated by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, was that the act was "a naked attempt on the
part of the state of Hawaii to take the private property of A and transfer it to B
solely for B's private use and benefit." 95 The Supreme Court disagreed with
that characterization. While noting that "one person's property may not be
taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public
purpose, even though compensation be paid,"'' i the Court found sufficient
public use to uphold the Land Reform Act. 97 Because of its holding that a
state's police power and its eminent domain power are identical in scope, the
Court's decision inevitably followed from its conclusion that "[r]egulating
oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police
powers.' 98
91. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
92. Id. at 2329.
93. Id. at 2329-30. Although Justice O'Connor attempted to distinguish T hompson v.
Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937), as invalidating an nicompensaled taking, 104 S. Ct.
at 2330, compensation would not have changed the Court's holding in that case. See Thompson. 300
U.S. at 80. Likewise, underJustice Holmes's analysis of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), a compensation provision would not have saved the Pennsylvania statute from the
Court's ruling of invalidity as applied to private parties. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
94. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2325-26.
95. Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983), rrv d sub iiot. Hawaii Housing Auth. v.
Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
96. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2329.
97. Id. at 2330.
98. Id.
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While Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon9 9 is never mentioned in the opinion, it
seems clear that Mahon's narrow view of what constitutes a public purpose
would be rejected under the Midkiff analysis. Under modern doctrine, the
Court would surely find the public interest in safety, furthered by a transfer of
support rights from the mining company to the private landowners living
above the mine, sufficient to uphold the taking if, of course, compensation
were provided.' 0 0
D. Federal Powers
Analyzing the legitimacy of government appropriations or regulations of
property poses special problems in the case of the federal government,
because it is a government of limited powers.' 0 First, nothing in the
Constitution explicitly confers a power of "eminent domain" on the federal
government; the words are never used. Rather, the only relevant language is
that of the fifth amendment, requiring that property not be "taken" for public
use without just compensation. Although the power of eminent domain
arguably could be inferred from this language, such an inference is
inconsistent with the general notion that all powers not expressly granted to
the federal government are reserved to the states. Furthermore, the Bill of
Rights is generally regarded as limiting, rather than expanding, the
government's powers. Therefore, the better interpretation is that the fifth
amendment imposes limitations on government "takings" that are necessary
and proper means of carrying out some enumerated power.' 0 2 For example,
in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 103 the Court analyzed the government's taking
as an exercise of commerce power: "In light of its expansive authority under
the Commerce Clause, there is no question but that Congress could assure
the public a free right of access to the Hawaii Kai Marina if it so chose." 1°14
This justification under the commerce power did not provide the answer to
the Court's inquiry into the compensation issue, however.' 0 5 In fact, it is clear
that the thesis of the police power test-that if a government act can be
subsumed under some other general legislative power, it is not an eminent
domain "taking"-cannot be valid at the federal level. Compensable takings
will always be the means to an end justified by some other power.
Nor can the scope of the federal taking power be analyzed under the police
power limitations espoused in Berman v. Parker'0 6 and Hawaii Housing Authority
99. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For a discussion of Mlahon, see supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
100. See sipra text accompanying notes 76-81.
101. Nichols, supra note 45, at 634-39. See generallyJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG. s0pra note
42, at 121.
102. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 42, at 480; 2A P. NICHOLS, NIctioLs ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.14(2) (U. Sackman rev. 3d ed. 1983); P. NICHOLS, smpra note 42, § 23; see. e.g.,
United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896).
103. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
104. Id. at 174.
105. Id.
106. 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
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v. Midkiff. 10 7 The simple reason is that there is no general federal police
power.' 08 If Congress has jurisdiction to legislate pursuant to one of its
enumerated powers, however, it may enact laws that resemble police power
regulations. 0 9 "It is no objection to the exercise of power of Congress that it
is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police
power of a State."'I 10 The most common jurisdictional hook is the commerce
power,"I but the taxing power is also often used." 2
Therefore, any limitation on federal taking power must come either from
limitations on the enumerated powers or from some remaining vitality of the
"public use" requirement of the fifth amendment. For example, in the
context of gun control legislation, Congress would have to first justify
legislation under some enumerated power, most likely the commerce power.
Given the expansive interpretation that has been accorded the commerce
power, such police power type legislation would undoubtedly withstand
judicial scrutiny. The leading case justifying federal regulation of health,
safety, and morals under Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce is
Champion v. Ames (the Lottery Case). 113 In that case, the Court supposed that
Congress enacted federal legislation prohibiting the sale of lottery tickets
through interstate commerce because the tickets were nuisances injurious to
public morality.' 14 Despite the apparent attempt by Congress to exercise
"police power," the Court upheld the legislation as supported by the
commerce clause.
The second amendment might also circumscribe federal gun legislation
efforts.' 5 If it were found that a ban on private possession of firearms
violated the second amendment, such a government act would of course be
invalidated, regardless of whether compensation was provided.
Finally, the "public use" requirement of the fifth amendment could still
retain some meaning independent of Congress' power to achieve the goal
effected by a taking. For example, the public use limitation on federal takings
107. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 91-100.
108. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 42, at 480. Therefore, Congress must rely on
an enumerated power, such as the commerce power, to establish jurisdiction for federal criminal
laws. See id. at 168-69.
109. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 291-92 (1981):
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436-39 (1925); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries &
Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919). With regard to the power to regulate liquor the Hamilton
Court held:
That the United States lacks the police power, and that this was reserved to the States by the
Tenth Amendment, is true. But it is none the less true that when the United States exerts an% of
the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, no valid objection can be based upon the fact
that such exercise may . . .tend to accomplish a similar purpose.
251 U.S. at 156. See also Daut v. United States, 405 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied. 402 U.S.
945 (1971); Speert v. Morgenthau, 116 F.2d 301, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Sax, supra note 5, at 36 n.6.
110. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 582 (1942).
Ill. See, e.g., Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (1982).
112. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1982) (taxes on tircarms).
113. 188 U.S. 321 (1902).
114. Id. at 355-56.
115. See generally United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (discussing but rejecting second
amendment challenge to firearm regulation).
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was discussed in Monsanto Co. v. EPA. 116 In that case, Monsanto challenged
amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) which required it to disclose certain trade secrets in applications
submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The district court
found that these requirements would disclose Monsanto's data to its
competitors, so that "[i]n effect, the 1978 amendments to FIFRA g[a]ve
Monsanto's competitors a free ride at Monsanto's expense."' 17 Monsanto
argued that the amendments effected a taking of its property (trade secrets)
for a private, rather than public, use and were beyond the power of
Congress."I8 The Supreme Court found that there was in fact a taking, but
that the regulation sufficiently benefitted the public interest in competition to
come within the public use requirement." 9 Astonishingly enough, the
Court's rationale was that "[s]uch a procompetitive purpose is well within the
police power of the Congress."' 120 Despite the arguable inaccuracy of this
statement, it does seem clear that a federal taking would not be limited any
more than a state taking by the public use requirement. Rather, such an act
will be upheld "[s]o long as the taking has a conceivable public character." 121
IV
PUBLIC USE
The first two parts of this taking analysis have discussed what kinds of
regulations are valid appropriations of private property. As was shown in the
last section, any appropriation of property by government must benefit the
public to be valid. For compensation to be required, validly appropriated
property not only must benefit the public, but also must actually be used by
the public or the government. 22 The present section outlines what
constitutes a public use.
The public use test is derived from the language of the fifth amendment:
"Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."1 23 The essential distinction which this test makes is between
taking property for public use, which is a compensable act, and taking
property for any other purpose, which is not.
Compensable public use regulations are inspired by the same desire for
public welfare that characterizes other valid appropriations. Certainly, an
appropriation of property to build a highway or a town hall is intended to
benefit the public. It is the nature of the use, however, and not the resulting
benefit to the public, which triggers the payment of compensation. In both of
116. 564 F. Supp. 552, 566-67 (E.D. Mo. 1983), vacated sub ion. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
117. 564 F. Supp. at 566.
118. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. at 2871.
119. Id. at 2879-80.
120. Id. at 2880.
121. Id. at 2879.
122. See supra note 76.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
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these situations, the public has used the property in the plain meaning of the
word "use." In the case of the highway the public will drive over the
appropriated land. In the case of the town hall the government (and
derivatively the public) will occupy the property.
In contrast, a public "use" does not exist where the public passively
benefits from the appropriation. There was no use, for example, of the cedar
trees which were destroyed in Miller v. Schoene. 124 Indeed, the felled trees
were explicitly left to Miller, to be used by him as he saw fit. 125 Similarly, if a
statute banned the possession of firearms, but created an exception for guns
which were rendered permanently inoperative, 26 the public would not use
the inoperative weapons. In these situations, the public does not use validly
appropriated property; thus the fifth amendment does not require
compensation.
The clearest example of the public use principle can be seen in the
imminent disaster cases in which the government used its emergency power.
In the most famous of these cases, United States v. Caltex (Philippines) Inc., 127 the
government destroyed oil reserves and the facilities in which they were stored
because the facilities were under imminent threat of being captured by the
Japanese. Prior to the destruction, the Army requisitioned a major share of
the oil reserves.' 28 The government paid for the petroleum but refused to
pay for the destroyed facilities.' 29 The Court upheld the refusal under the
theory that the destruction of private property in war must be "borne by the
sufferers alone."' 3 0
Although the Court did not rely on a public use rationale, it seems clear
that the test can easily explain the Caltex result. The oil reserves that the Army
requisitioned were taken for government use and thus would be compensable
losses under the public use test. The oil facility was destroyed in an act of
evil-avoidance and as such resulted in no public or government use. As a
result, that destruction and all other "injury of private property in battle"''
were noncompensable losses.
Although the Court has never explicitly adopted the public use test, it used
a similar analysis to bolster its judgment that the landmark preservation law in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York' 32 did not effect a
compensable taking. Penn Central involved a New York City ordinance which
prevented certain kinds of structural alterations to buildings which were
determined to have historic and architectural value. The Penn Central
Transportation Company wished to build an office tower over Grand Central
124. 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928).
125. Id.
126. See, for example, the ordinance at issue in Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp.
1169, 1171 (N.D. 11. 1981), aff-d, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), ceit. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
127. 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
128. Id. at 150.
129. Id. at 151.
130. Id. at 153.
131. Id.
132. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Station but was prevented from doing so by the ordinance. It therefore sued
New York City for the loss in value to its property that resulted from the
restriction.' 33 Among a loosely structured series of holdings which will be
discussed more fully below, the Court found that the restriction did not result
in government or public use:
[T]he Landmarks Law neither exploits appellants' parcel for city purposes nor
facilitates nor arises from any entrepreneurial operation of the city. . . . The
Landmarks Law's effect is simply to prohibit appellants or anyone else from occupying
portions of the airspace above the Terminal, while permitting appellants to use the
remainder of the parcel in a gainful fashion. This is no more an appropriation of
property by government for its own use than is a zoning law . ... 134
In Penn Central the Court thus distinguished, as does the test proposed in this
note, between mere passive benefit to the public and active use by the public or
government. Only the latter requires compensation.
The public use portion of the test proposed here bears some similarity to
the test which Professor Sax has set forth. Sax distinguishes between
regulations that enhance the government's "enterprise capacity" and
regulations that are enacted pursuant to the government's "arbitral
capacity."' 35 He defines enterprise capacity as "the economic function of
providing for and maintaining the material plant, whether that be the state
capitol or a [state-run] retail liquor store."' 136 In contrast, the government
acts in its arbitral capacity when it regulates to avoid evil or to promote the
public welfare by reconciling differences among private interests in the
community. It is acting in this capacity when "it says, as between neighbors,
that one fellow must cease keeping pigs in his backyard or must cease making
bricks at a certain location."'' 37 The rule that Sax proposes is that when
government appropriates property in its enterprise capacity, compensation is
required.'138 "But," Sax writes, "losses, however severe, incurred as a
consequence of government acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be
viewed as a non-compensable exercise of the police power."' 139
The differences between the Sax test and the test proposed in this note are
more cosmetic than substantive. Whereas Sax wishes to incorporate new
vocabulary into a field already overflowing with terms of art (noxious use,
diminution in value, etc.), this note's public use terminology returns to the
words used in the amendment itself. Further, whereas Sax dismisses the
earlier tests as generally unhelpful,' 4 0 the public use test incorporates them in
a systematic way and thus comes closer to established doctrine. 14 1
133. Id. at 116-19.
134. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
135. Sax, supra note 5. at 62-63.
136. Id. at 62.
137. Id. at 62-63.
138. Id. at 63.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 37.
141. These differences will result in different outcomes in some situations. Because the Sax test
does not require that there be an initial finding of appropriation (the first step of the public use test),
it would compensate the landowners in the overflight cases where property was not directly below
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The public use test also has the advantage of explaining why the more
traditional tests-physical invasion, diminution in value, noxious use, and
police power-work or do not work in a given case. The physical
appropriation test seems to work well because government does in fact often
use the property which it has appropriated. On the other hand, the numerous
exceptions to the physical appropriation rule can only be explained by testing
them against the remaining two inquiries of the public use test. For example,
the owners of the fishing nets in Miller v. McLaughlint42 and the owner of the
liquor in Samuels v. McCurdy143 both suffered confiscation of their property by
the government without payment of compensation. The governmental acts in
both cases were justified as valid police power, evil-avoidance legislation. The
government's confiscation, however, was not undertaken with the purpose of
acquiring property with the intent to use it. It is not clear how the
government disposed of the appropriated property-perhaps the nets and
liquor were destroyed-but in neither case was the property reemployed by
the public.
The public use requirement similarly explains the disparity in the airport
overflight cases. In United States v. Causby144 and Griggs v. Allegheny County, t45
the property owners' airspace was actually occupied, or used, by the
airplanes.' 46  That the degree of damage to property owners is not
particularly determinative of a "taking" is evidenced by the cases holding that
neighboring property owners, who may have been identically damaged, are
not entitled to compensation.' 47 One may flinch at the seeming injustice of
the flight paths. Sax, supra note 5, at 67-69. These owners were damaged by vibrations and noise but
the government did not actually take an interest in their airspace. Although justice would at first
seem to require compensation, the taking clause does not require it because there was no
appropriation.
This note's tripartite analysis also explains another line of cases, the outcome of which Sax admits
does not fit within his scheme. These are cases in which the government required the railroads to
build grade crossings where the railroad right-of-way crossed either a public highway or watercourse.
See id. at 70; see, e.g., Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953). The courts
have consistently held that the railroads could be required to bear the entire burden without any
government compensation. Sax, supra note 5, at 70. Under the Sax test, compensation should be
required, since the government is engaged in its enterprise capacity of improving the public
highways. Id.
What Sax fails to note is that railroad rights-of-way are specialized interests in land that are not
accorded conventional treatment. For example, the Supreme Court upheld a statute requiring a
railroad to bear all the costs of destroying old bridges and constructing new ones over a watercourse
in Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561 (1906). The Court
characterized the watercourse as a natural easement. Id. at 587. It then reiterated with approval the
Illinois Supreme Court's finding that at common law a railroad which crossed a watercourse or
highway had to build and maintain the railroad so as to accommodate the easement "for all future
time." 1d. If the easement required maintenance to accommodate all future use, then nothing was
appropriated when the government required the bridge to be rebuilt. The railroad crossing cases,
therefore, come to the correct result under the tripartite public use test.
142. 281 U.S. 261 (1930).
143. 267 U.S. 188 (1925).
144. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
145. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
147. See Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Batten v. United States. 306 F.2d 580
(10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
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such distinctions, but it is clear that the fifth amendment draws the line
between properties actually used and those "merely" damaged.
The public use test also helps explain why the diminution in value
argument has been so universally unsatisfactory. Simply put, it would be a
rare instance where it could be shown that the government used property
which it had not in fact taken title to or possession of, but rather had merely
regulated in a way that diminished its value to the owner.
The diminution in value argument has frequently been rebutted by the
police power and noxious use tests. In these instances, the Court will uphold
a regulation that severely diminishes property values on the grounds that the
regulation is a valid exercise of police power. While no doubt true, the
argument is singularly unhelpful as a test. In Mugler v. Kansas, 148 for example,
the closing of Mugler's brewery surely decreased the value of his property,
since presumably the brewery could not have been put to alternative uses
without substantial investment, if indeed it could be put to alternative uses at
all. The closing of the brewery was just as surely valid as a police power
means to abate a nuisance. The compensation issue, however, should have
been determined not by whether the public thereby benefitted from the
brewery closing, but by whether the public in fact actually used the property.
In those evil-avoidance cases in which the property is actually destroyed,
such as the spoiled milk case, Adams v. Milwaukee,"4 9 clearly the first test of
appropriation is met. The property owner owned the milk before the
government action; afterward he did not. The second question, the power of
the government to act, is similarly met by the Court's finding that the
destruction of the milk was a valid means for the government to protect the
public. However, the third inquiry, requiring public use, is not satisfied since
the public obviously could not make use of the milk which no longer existed.
In contrast, if the government had tried to culture antibodies in the spoiled
milk, compensation would clearly have been required.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 15° serves as a useful
illustration of how the public use test can be applied more rationally than the
current taking tests. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Penn Central
actually encompassed all three of the test's inquiries, although not in the
order or relationship suggested in this note. The opinion clearly examined
the legitimacy of the New York City Landmarks Law, which Penn Central
attacked as arbitrary and inequitable in its application. 15 In upholding the
law, the Court cited the finding of the New York Court of Appeals that the
implementation of the objectives of the Landmarks Law constituted an
"acceptable reason for singling out one particular parcel for different and less
favorable treatment." 15 2
148. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
149. 228 U.S. 572 (1913).
150. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
151. Id. at 131-33.
152. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 330, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 918, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (1977), quoted in Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 132 n.28.
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The Court also found that the government had not appropriated the
property for its own use.' 53 According to the public use test, the inquiry
would end there, for the Court's holding that no compensation was necessary
would have been fully justified at that point. But the opinion then proceeded
to look at the public use test's threshold level question of appropriation, in
terms of the diminution of value test:
Rejection of appellants' broad arguments is not, however, the end of our inquiry, for
all we thus far have established is that the New York City law is not rendered invalid by
its failure to provide "just compensation" whenever a landmark owner is restricted in
the exploitation of property interests, such as air rights, to a greater extent than
provided for under applicable zoning laws. We now must consider whether the
interference with appellants' property is of such magnitude that "there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain it." 1 54
The Court then found that Penn Central was not sufficiently damaged to
justify compensation. However, the opinion emphasized that the holding was
based on the present record, which showed "Penn Central's present ability to
use the Terminal for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion."'' 55 The
Court implied that if the Terminal had ceased to be "economically viable,"
compensation might have been appropriate. 56
The idea that compensation to a given property owner affected by a
government regulation should depend on the severity of the regulation's
impact on his parcel misinterprets the law of eminent domain. Of course, the
severity of the harm is relevant in determining the amount of a compensation
award, once it is determined that compensation is to be paid. But an act of
government is either an eminent domain taking or it is not; its
characterization as a taking should not vary according to the resulting
financial condition of the property owners affected. Indeed, an argument can
be made that once the government has determined that a property owner is
entitled to compensation, it denies equal protection of the laws if it fails to
compensate all property owners affected by the government act in question,
even if they are damaged to a lesser degree.
The public use test proposed by this note avoids these inquiries and
focuses, instead, on the factors that are truly relevant: (1) Has there been an
appropriation? (2) Is the appropriation a legitimate exercise of power? and (3)
Does the public actually use the appropriated property?
V
FIREARMS AND TAKING LAW
Before analyzing a ban on the possession of firearms under this three-part
test, it will be useful to consider whether the ban would require just
compensation under the more traditional tests: the physical appropriation
153. 438 U.S. at 135; see supra text accompanying note 134.
154. 438 U.S. at 135-36.
155. Id. at 138 n.36.
156. Id.
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test, the diminution in value test, the police power test, and the noxious use
test.
Insofar as a statute would require firearm owners to surrender their
weapons to the government, the physical appropriation test would be met.
The owner would have had a fee simple interest in the weapon before the law
was passed and no interest whatsoever after the weapon was turned in. Under
this test, therefore, compensation would be required.
It is likely, however, that a law would be more narrowly drawn. For
example, the ordinance passed by the Village of Morton Grove forbade the
possession of handguns within the village unless (a) the gun was rendered
permanently inoperative; (b) the owner was a licensed gun collector, peace
officer, prison official, or member of the armed forces; or (c) the gun was kept
at a gun club.' 57 Each of these situations shifts the analysis from physical
appropriation to diminution in value.
Since the Supreme Court has apparently never actually found there to be a
taking under this test, it is unclear how much of a diminution would cause
compensation to be required. If the Morton Grove alternatives were
incorporated into a federal ban, the greatest diminution would occur if the
gun were rendered permanently inoperative. In that case, the gun would have
value only as a collectible or antique. Under Goldblatt v. Hempstead, however,
the fact that the law deprives property of its most beneficial use does not
require that compensation be paid.' 58 The next greatest diminution would
occur if the owner were forced to keep the gun at a club. The weapon could
still be used, but not in one's home. Again, the Goldblatt holding would
uphold the regulation without compensation.
If a firearm ban were drafted to prohibit ownership or possession without
providing for government confiscation, the diminution in value test might
indeed be met, since an owner would be deprived of all rights in his gun. The
district court that considered the Morton Grove ordinance avoided this issue
by pointing out that guns could be sold outside of the village. Therefore,
because an owner could fully recover the value of his gun, there was no
"destruction of the use and enjoyment of a legitimate private property
right."' 159 The same reasoning would apply if a state forbade firearm
ownership. Thus, the right to sell might be sufficient to overcome the
diminution of value test at the state level. A court might draw the line,
however, at a federal ban on possession or ownership and consider the guns
unsaleable, even if it were legal to transport firearms across international
borders. Such a federal ban would thus be found to be a total diminution of
value and would be a compensable taking under that test.
The third test which has been used is the police power test. If a state were
to pass a law banning the possession of firearms, it could surely justify the act
157. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 1981), af'd, 695 F.2d
261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied. 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
158. 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962).
159. 532 F. Supp. at 1184.
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under its police powers to punish crime and generally legislate for the health
and safety of its citizens. Under cases like Fesjian v. Jefferson, 16) Mugler v.
Kansas,16 1 and Samuels v. McCurdy, 162 which held that no compensation is
required when a state law represents an exercise of the police power, such a
state ban would not be a compensable taking. At the federal level, the "police
power" test applies only by analogy. Under the rationale of the test, so long
as an act can be characterized as pursuant to some power other than the
eminent domain power, it need not be accompanied by compensation. 63
Under this test, then, if federal firearm legislation were passed pursuant to the
commerce or taxing powers, it would not be a compensable taking. (This test
is applied here to federal legislation as part of a demonstrative exercise of the
various taking tests, although such an application is, of course, illogical.
Because there is no federal eminent domain power, all federal laws are passed
under an enumerated power. Therefore, no federal law could ever require
compensation under this theory.)
The final test which has been used is the noxious use test. Under this test,
which is often coupled with the police power test, evil-avoidance legislation
does not require just compensation. Thus, in Mugler v. Kansas, 164 in which a
lawfully operated brewery was closed under a prohibition statute which
declared the brewery to be a public nuisance, the Court held that legislation
to abate a nuisance was not a fifth amendment taking.1 65 This logic has also
been applied to consumers. In Samuels v. McCurdy, 166 McCurdy had a supply
of liquor which was lawfully acquired before the state of Georgia banned its
possession. Nevertheless, the Court upheld seizure as a valid exercise of state
power to reduce the "evils of drunkenness."' 167
By analogy, a state or federal government could declare all firearms or
handguns in particular to be an evil to be avoided for the benefit of the public.
Surely, if the presence of liquor in a community can be prohibited under a
nuisance abatement theory, the threat of firearm deaths by accident or
violence could support the declaration of firearms as a nuisance with equally
strong justification. Thus, under the noxious use test, no compensation
would be required for a confiscation of firearms.
It is clear from this summary that these tests reach contradictory results.
The physical invasion and diminution in value tests point toward
compensation, while the police power and noxious use tests point toward no
compensation. Without a statement of how to resolve or balance the tests, it
is impossible to resolve taking questions except in the "ad hoc" manner used
160. 399 A.2d 861 (D.C. 1979) (firearm legislation).
161. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (liquor prohibition).
162. 267 U.S. 188 (1925) (liquor prohibition).
163. See Sax, supra note 5, at 36-37 n.6 (referring to the conflict between commerce clause
regulations and fifth amendment takings as "parallel" to the police power-eminent domain
distinction at the state level).
164. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
165. Id. at 669.
166. 267 U.S. 188 (1925).
167. Id. at 198.
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in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 168 The three-part public
use test, however, can be applied with more certainty. The following analysis
describes how a federal or state ban would be analyzed under this test.
The first issue is whether the ban would result in an appropriation. Under
this threshold inquiry, either an outright physical invasion or a significant
diminution in value would constitute an appropriation. If the ban simply
required all weapons to be turned in, it is clear that an appropriation would
have occurred. Even in the absence of a physical transfer, however, the
owners' property rights in their guns would be appropriated if the guns could
not be kept at home, if they had to be rendered inoperative, or if they could
not be possessed at all. As has been emphasized previously, such diminution
in value is not dispositive of the taking issue. The continued adherence of the
courts to the doctrine nevertheless represents a recognition that an affected
property owner legitimately feels that something has been taken from him. It
would be foolish not to concede that at least some portion of a gun owner's
property in a firearm is appropriated when he cannot fire it. Unfortunately,
from his point of view, this appropriation is not compensated because of the
outcome of the remainder of this analysis.
The second issue is whether the ban would be a valid exercise of
government authority. State firearm legislation could easily withstand
scrutiny as a valid exercise of police power. This power would not be
circumscribed by the second amendment, because that amendment has never
been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment to bind the states. 169
If a firearm ban were enacted at the federal level, it would have to be
justified under one of the government's enumerated powers. Congress could,
for example, find that the law was necessary to protect commerce because it
would prevent robberies. This note expresses no opinion on the validity of
that assumption, but presumes that a congressional finding to that effect
would be sufficient to invoke the commerce clause. A federal firearm law
would also have to be tested under the second amendment, but, as stated
earlier, that analysis is not within the compass of this note. For our purposes,
it is assumed that a federal ban would be upheld as a valid exercise of
government power.
The final issue is whether the ban would be for public use as the term has
been defined in this note. If the ban were passed in response to some kind of
military emergency in which the government needed to give the confiscated
weapons to the armed forces, the ban would clearly be an example of public
use and require compensation. Such military use would be available only to
the federal government. Theoretically, though, a state government could
similarly confiscate firearms for the sole purpose of equipping its police force,
for example. In that case, too, compensation would be required. Such
examples are exceptions, however, to the ordinary intent of firearms
168. See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
169. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876). See generalvJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, supra note 42, at 413.
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legislation. Such laws would much more likely be passed for the purpose of
ridding society of firearms and not because there is a public need to use the
weapons. In fact, the weapons would probably be destroyed after seizure. In
this more likely case, the public would benefit passively from the arguably
safer society in which they would live. This benefit, however, is not public use
as defined in this note and does not require compensation under the fifth
amendment.
Thus, under the three-part public use test, no compensation would be
required by the fifth amendment if there were a federal or state ban on the
possession of firearms. Such a result may seem viscerally unfair; however, one
must remember that if every regulation of property required compensation, a
government would be unable to operate. More importantly, this result is
dictated by the words of the Constitution. Under the analysis proposed in this
note, that constitutional language is capable of a single, clear interpretation,
which can guide courts to a rational treatment of the taking issue.

